Though the Senate vote indicated that civil war was trying to be avoided, the hatred and/or political fear of Caesar simply couldn't be compromised. On 1st December 50 BC, Curio proposed a motion that would force both Pompey and Caesar to simultaneously lay down their commands, and the motion was passed 370 votes to 22. Curio, however, turned the tables and forced a unique vote to the senate floor. They stayed in Italy and were given to Pompey in a shrewd move that strengthened Pompey whilst weakening Caesar.īy late 50 BC, various attempts were made by the Consul Marcellus to stifle Caesar's tribunes and allow some measures of anti-Caesarean policy to go through. Caesar was left with eight legions, and the legions that he had given up were never sent to Parthia.
In a wise move, the Senate boldly stripped Caesar of two legions though, one of his own, and one that Pompey had lent Caesar several years earlier during the Gallic revolt. Already, in the autumn of 50 BC, in an effort to weaken Caesar, the Senate asked both he and Pompey to give up one legion each (Pompey had his armies in Spain) to secure the east against Parthia. The year 49 BC was shaping up to be yet another stalemate politically for Caesar, but he was quite simply running out of time. His legate Marcus Antonius was elected as Tribune for the same year, and a former opponent, Gaius Scribonius Curio was also elected but paid handsomely to side with Caesar. More optimate officials were elected in 50 BC to take office for 49 BC, but Caesar still managed to hold ground. The situation continued in a virtual stalemate, with neither side willing to budge on their legal standpoints. Caesar's only hope in Rome from a legal standpoint was the intervention of the Tribunes of the Plebes, who managed to veto any attempts to bring Caesar to his knees. Marcus Claudius Marcellus, Consul for 51 BC, tried to have Caesar recalled from his command prior to its actual legal expiration, and in 50 BC, his cousin Gaius Claudius Marcellus attempted to do the same. The Lex Pompeia De Magistratibus that was passed while Pompey was Consul without colleague forced a candidate to be present in Rome to run for office, and of course, one couldn't legally bring their legions to Rome for protection. His jealously over Caesar's success and his ultimate goal of acceptance and power within the Senate took him ever further from the alliance with Caesar. Caesar badly desired the ability to run for the Consulship in abstentia, thereby allowing him the safe transfer of protection from his Proconsular Imperium, granted by his command in Gaul, to that of the actual Consulship once again.īy this time however, Pompey, likely the only man able to smooth things over, had clearly sided with the optimates. The years 50 and 49 BC were pivotal because during this timeframe, Caesar's 'imperium' or safety from prosecution was set to expire. Prosecuting Caesar, whether the goal was death, exile or just a symbolic limitation of his power, would prevent his re-establishment of the populares agenda that he so masterfully manipulated previously. In fact, many argued that the protection of Cisalpine Gaul and Narbonensis didn't require the war that Caesar conducted in the larger part of Gaul in the first place. They wanted to prosecute Caesar for a variety of reasons, including conducting an illegal war into Germania that the Senate had never authorized. Such actions were destabilizing and dangerous for the health of the Republican system. Caesar's original Consulship in 59 BC was one in which he not only thwarted optimate interests, but pushed forward a populares agenda that not only made life miserable for the conservatives, but generally rejected the law and political custom. That was only one small piece of the puzzle however. Though the common people noticed little effect, and seemingly loved Caesar, the optimates had a great deal to lose from this devaluation of their wealth.
These conquests not only brought in a great number of slaves, but brought so much monetary wealth into Rome, that the value of gold was actually reduced by as much as a quarter or even a third of its value before the wars. The optimates despised Caesar and his conquests (viewing much of his campaigning as unwarranted and illegal) and looked for every opportunity to strip him of his command. After Caesar spent 51 BC and the better part of 50 BC touring his newly conquered province of Gaul, political chaos was developing back in Rome.
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